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In the Supreine Court
of the State o~f Utah

WILFRIED ROSSBERG and
IVY ROSSBERG,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

CASE

No. 7802

LEONARD A. HOLESAPPLE
and IRMA HOLESAPPLE,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT O,F FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment declaring a note
and its security to be null, void, and usurious, and an
order cancelling the same.
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Plaintiff Wilfried Rossberg is a salesman for Christensen Realty Company, owned and operated by Mr.
Milton L. Christensen, a licensed real estate broker.
In the course of his employment, prior to April 11,
1951, Mr. Rossberg showed defendants a home at 965
Atkin Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 4) On April 11,
1951 the defendants, as buyers, and Jack H. Rohlfing
and LaVon M. Rohlfing, his wife, as sellers, executed
an Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement for the purchase and sale of this home for a price of $16,500.00.
(Exhibit A.) A $500.00 down payment was made and by
the agreement defendants were to pay an additional
$2000.00 on delivery of final eontract of sale which was
to be on or before April 20, 1951. The balance was to be
paid in monthly payments. At closing time (April 20,
1951) defendants were unable to make the $2000.00
payment, having been unable to obtain the money from
relatives as planned. (R. 6) For this reason and the
prospects of forfeiting the earnest money the defendants
were quite disheartened. (R. 6) There was some talk of
the defendant's brother buying the property, instead
of the defendants, because he considered it to be a
good buy. (R. 7, 36) Later defendants told Mr. Milton
L. Christensen they couldn't go through with the deal
because they couldn't raise the money. (R. 39) The
closing date passed and defendants were still desirous
of having the property. On the night of April 21,
1951, upon the invitation of Mrs. Holesapple, Mr. Rossberg and Mr. Christensen stopped at defendants' home.
Present, in addition to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Ros~-
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berg, was ~Irs. Holesapple. (R. 7, 8, 37) After some
discussion of the problem of finance Mr. Rossberg indicated he n1ight be able to obtain 1noney for them. (R. 8,
37) No decision was made at this time but it was agreed
the matter \Yould be discussed the next morning, Sunday, April 22, 1951. (R. 8, 51, 52)
The next morning defendants requested Mr. Rossberg to see what he could do to obtain the money. (R. 8)
He explained it would be necessary to obtain the money
fron1 some other person, that he would have to go to
Logan to contact his father-in-law. (R. 8, 9, 54) Mr.
Holesapple testified that Mr. Rossberg indicated he was
going to Logan to see his father-in-law and would try
to get the necessary money. (R. 52) He understood that
Mr. Rossberg was going to try and get the money by
use of his (Rossberg's) credit. (R. 53) He also testified that he was told it would cost him $100.00. (R. 53)
He said Mr. Christensen and Mr. Rossberg agreed to
absorb this cost although both of these gentlemen deny
it. (R. 29, 52) Mr. Rossberg testified he did go to Logan
and obtained $1500.00 from a friend of his father-inlaw after his father-in-law had vouched for Mr. Rossberg's credit. (R. 9, 10) Mr. Rossberg agreed to repay
to this gentleman $1500.00 plus interest at 6%. (R. 10)
On the morning of April 23, 1951, he told defendants he
had obtained the money and they indicated agreement.
(R. 11) They informed the company they would be
out that night to close the deal but they didn't come,
(R. 11, 22).
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Mr. Christensen and Mr. Rohlfing, the seller, testified that "three or four days" after the closing date
two real estate contr:acts were signed by Mr. Rohlfing
and wife, one of which was Exhibit B, bearing date of
April 23, 1951. Both testified they were identical documents, except for the names of the buyers. (R. 32, 38)
Exhibit B shows the defendants as buyers, while the
other document showed the plaintiffs as buyers. At
this signing it was agreed, and both testified, that Mr.
Christensen was to give Holesapples the opportunity
to purchase and if they did not then Mr. and Mrs. Rossberg were to purchase. ( R. 33, 43, 40) The length of time
during which defendants could purchase was to be determined in Mr. Christensen's discretion. (R. 33, 40). He
testified of a discussion with Mr. and Mrs. Holesapple
wherein he advised of the seller's desire to close the
deal and if they wanted to buy, the deal would be closed
with them, but if they didn't want to buy, Mr. and
Mrs. Rossberg would purchase. (R. 39) He was told
by the Holesapples that as far as they were concerned
they couldn't go through with it and inquired if they could
have their money returned. Mr. Christensen agreed
they could. (R. 39) After being advised the Holesapples
could not go through with the deal, Mr. and Mrs. Rossberg
signed the Real Estate Contract which had previously
been signed by the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Rohlfing. (R.14,
41) Mr. Christensen and Mr. Rossberg each testified
that Mr. Rossberg made a payment of $1250 pursuant
to this contract. (R. 13, 19) This was further supported
by Exhibit C, a check for $1250.00 payable to Christensen
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Realty Co. Mr. Christensen testified that following this
he informed defendants the home had been purchased
by Mr. Rossberg and wife. (R. 41)
The next day def,~ndants contacted Mr. Christensen
and told him they would now like to buy the house
if they could get the money from Mr. Rossberg. (R. 16,
42) Mr. Christensen stated it was agreeable with him
if agreeable with Mr. Rossberg. Later that day the
defendants came in and signed Exhibit B, and the real
estate contract previously signed by Mr. and Mrs. Rossberg was destroyed. ( R. 15, 42).
At this time defendants also signed a 90-day note
for $1600.00 as set forth in paragraph I of the complaint,
and the assignment described in paragraph II of the
complaint, assigning their contract interest to Rossbergs as security for the note. Plaintiffs were not present at this signing. Plaintiffs had previously made available to defendants $1250.00 by releasing the payment
made pursuant to the contract with Rohlfings, and
$250.00 by check, total $1500.00. At the time of closing
Mr. Holesapple understood Mr. and Mrs. Rossberg had
purchased the property and that they were giving up
whatever rights they had in the property in favor of the
Holesa pple purchase. ( R. 53). In signing the note he
did npt. intend to violate the law and had no knowledge
of what constituted usury. (R. 54) He understood the
note included a $100 fee for obtaining the money and
he was agreeable to sign. ( R. 53) He testified he
could do nothing else but sign because, "they had five
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hundred dollars of my money", although he testified Mr.
Christensen had offered his check back and told him he
could have his money back on several occasions. (R. 53).
Mr. Christensen testified the value of the property
at the time of the sale was $1000.00 more than the sale
price. ( R. 49).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the note upon
maturity plaintiffs brought action to require the sale
of the security to satisfy the amount due 'and owing
plaintiffs, and for a deficiency judgment if the security
failed to satisfy the amount due and owing. Defendants pleaded usury. This was the only issue in the
trial court.
The District Court found the note and assignment
of security were executed and delivered by defendants
to plaintiffs; that the note for $1600.00 was given in
consideration of the payment of $1500.00 and that no
further consideration whatsoever was given by plaintiffs to defendants for said note. The court found the
note to be usurious and void and ordered that judgment
be granted to defendants against plaintiffs for no cause
of action and that the note and assignment were declared
to be null, void, and usurious and ordered them canceled.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT No. 1.
ment to be null
because there is
corrupt intent, a

The decree holding the note and assigJIand void and usurious cannot stand
no pleading, evidence, or finding of a
necessary element of usury.
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PoiNT No. 2. rrhe decree cannot stand because the
evidence shows a. sale of plaintiff's credit rather than a
loan of nwney frmn plaintiff, the latter being an essential
element of usury.
PoiNT ~ o. 3. The judgn1ent is faulty because the
evidence fails to show an exaction of more interest than
is allowed by law.
POINT No. 4. The decree of the District Court should
not be sustained because it defeats the announced purpose of the usury statute.
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Since many factors are common to most of appellants' points it seems advisable to set forth in a preliminary statement the applicable statutes, the law on
the construction of usury laws, burden and quantum of
proof, and the necessary elements. of usury.
STATUTES:
The following are from Utah Code Annotated, 1943:
'' 44-0-2. Maximum Rates. The parties to any
contract may agree in writing for the payment of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or things in action, not to exceed, excep·t
as otherwise provided by law, ten per cent per
annum;* • * .''
'' 44-0-6. Usury. Contracts Void. All bonds,
bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, stocks,
pledges, mortgages and deeds of trust, and all
other contracts and securities whatsoever, whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken
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·or secured, any greater sum or greater value for
a loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action than is prescribed shall be void.''
'' 44-0-9. Usury. Restraining Action on U suurious Contract- Return of Securities. Whenever it shall satisfactorily appear that any bond,
bill, note, assurance, pledge, conveyance, mortgage, deed of trust, contract, security or other
evidence of debt has been taken or received in
violation of the provisions of this title, the court
shall declare the same to be void, and enjoin any
prosecution thereon, and shall order the same to
be surrendered and canceled, and any property,
real or personal, embraced within the terms of
such contracts, and all securities, to be delivered
up, is in possession of the defendant in the action;
or, if the same -are in the possession of the plaintiff, provision shall be made in the judgment or
decree in the action removing the cloud of such
usurious contracts or securities from the title
to ·such property.
CoNSTRUCTION OF USURY

LAws :

The construction to be given these statutes has been
clearly enunciated by this court in Cobb v. Hartenstein,
47 Utah 174, 152 P. 424, in which the court adopted the
following words from 39 Cyc. 917 as the rule in determining whether a given contract or transaction is tainted
with usury:
''Since usury laws are quasi penal, the courts
will not hold a contract to be in violation of the
usury laws, unless upon a fair and reasonable
construction of all its terms, in view of the dealings of the parties, it is manifest that the intent
of the parties was to engage in such transaction
10
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as is forbidden by those laws. If two reasonable
cop.structions are possible by one of which the
contract will be legal and valid, while by the
other it will be usurious and invalid, the court
will always adopt the former. In short, the general rule of interpretation and construction of
such contracts may be said to be that the contract
is not usurious when it may be explained on any
other hypothesis.''
And from Rosenblum v. Gomall, et al., 52 Utah 206,
173 P. 243:
''In view of the drastic provisions of our
statute the proof must be clear and convincing
respecting the usurious character of the instrument.''~

The Utah Court in Culmer Parint and Glass Co. v.
Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66, in discussing our usury
statute said:
''This is a most drastic statute, since it for- \
feits the creditors entire claim. The statute au- \
thorizes more than confiscation for public use, \
since the debtor seems to be entirely relieved from ·
his obligation to pay, in case usury is established.
Courts always abhor forfeitures, and this is especially true of courts of equity. Forfeitures, therefore, especially such as have the effect of taking
prpperty from one and giving it to another, should
be enforced only when the proof is clear and convincing, if not beyond a reasonable doubt.''
"It is usually said that usury laws, penal in
nature-that is, statutes which make the taking
of illegal interest an offense and prescribe a
penalty therefor-should be construed with reasonable strictness." 55 Amer. Juris. 327.
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BuRDEN AND QuANTUM oF PROOF:

The burden of proof is upon the party who alleges
the usury to establish it by at least clear and convincing
evidence and not merely by a preponderance thereof.
Brown v. Johnson, 43 Utah 1, 134 P. 590. See also Van
N oy v. Goldberg, 98 Cal. App. 604, 277 P. 538.
"The burden of proving that a transaction is
infected with usury lies upon him who attacks
it, and that fact, it is held, must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. Even though the
law does not wholly avoid the contract, it has
been held that the proof of usury must be clear
an_9. satisfactory, and this would seem to be particularly true where the effect of usury is to
render the contract void." 55 Amer. Juris. 437.
The Utah Court in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra,
quoted with approval from Wood v. Babbitt, 149 Fed.
822:
"It is not enough that the circumstances
proved render it highly probable that there is a
corrupt bargain; such a bargain must be proved,
and not left to conjecture."
In the same case (Cobb v. Hartenstein) the court
quoted from Lusk v. Smith, 71 Kans. 556, 81 P. 175:
''Again, the existence of ,a usurious contract
is never presumed. Where an agreement to pay
interest is subject to two constructions, one of
which would make it usurious, and the other not,
t~~ court will adopt the latter * * * . The burden
is upon the party seeking to impeach the transaction to show guilty intent, and that the contract
was a cover for usury."

12
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The court further stated 1n Cobb v. Hartenstein,
supra, at page 428 :
''The courts also differ with respect to the
quantum of proof that is required; some holding
that the proof should be beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under our statute the taking or receiving
of a greater sum of money, or goods, or things
in action of greater value than permitted by the
statute for a loan or forbearance of money constitutes, as we have seen, a misdemeanor and is
punishable as such. In order to convict under
the statute upon a criminal charge, no doubt,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be required. Where the action, however, merely involves civil liability, we think that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is not required; but the evi- dence must, nevertheless, be strong, clear, and
convincing; that is, it must be of such a character as to convince the understanding and satisfy
the judgment of the court or jury. See Culmer,
etc., Co. v. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66; Brown
v. Johnson, 43 Utah 3, 134 P. 590,46 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1157 ; Fisher v. Adamson, 151 P. 351. ''
ELEMENTS OF USURY:

The Utah Court has repeatedly affirmed its position
as to the essential elements of usury. In Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, and Fisher v. Adamson, supra, the court
quoted with approval a statement from 39 Cyc. 918:
''In deciding whether any given transaction is
usurious or not, the courts will disregard the
form which it may take, and look only to the substance of the transaction, in order to determine
whether all the requisites of usury are present.
These requisites are: (1) An unlawful intent;
13
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(2) the subject matter must be money or money's
equivalent; (3) a loan or forbearance; (4) the
sum loaned must be absolutely, not contingently,
repayable, and ( 5) there must be an exaction for
the use of the loan of something in excess of what
is 1allowed by law. If all of these requisites are
found to be present, the transaction will be condemned as usurious, whatever form it may assume
and despite any disguise it may wear. But if any
one of these requisites is lacking, the transaction
is not usurious although it may bear the outward
m~rks of usury."
To the same effect see 55 Am. Jur. 331; Teschcer v.
Roome, 106 Or. 382, 212 P. 473.
The appellants, with these matters in mind, now
respectfully request consideration of their points.
POINT NO. 1.
THE DECREE HOLDING THE NOTE. AND ASSIGNMENT TO BE NULL AND VOID AND USURIOUS CANNOT
STAND BECAUSE THERE IS NO PLEADING,-EVIDENCE,
OR FINDING OF A CORRUPT INTENT, A NECESSARY
ELEMENT OF USURY.

The law in this state is very clear that a willful
intent to violate the usury law is a necessary element
of usury and must be proved and not left to conjecture.
This doctrine is approved in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra,
Fisher v. Adamson, supra, Mathis et al. v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 Utah 499, 166 P. (2) 518; Brown v. Johnson,
43 Utah 1, 134 P. 590, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1157, Ann.
Cas. 1916C, 321.
In Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, the court said:
'' * * * in order to establish usury, the existence
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of an unlawful or corrupt purpose is one of the
essential elements which must be clearly proved
to exist at the time of the contract or transaction
which is claimed to be usurious is entered into.
Where the contract upon its face is usurious,
the intention may be inferred, and the inference
may be so strong that no express denial can
avoid the same. Where, however, as here, the
contract is legitimate, * * * , but it is nevertheless contended that it is a mere shift, cloak,
or cover for usury, then it requires substantial
evidence of a corrupt or unlawful intent, or some
fact or facts from which such an intention may
be clearly inferred.''
To emphasize this point the court quoted from Bank
v. Waggener, 9 Pet. 399, 9 L. Ed. 163, in which Mr.
Justice Storey of the Kentucky Supreme Court said:
"It must be proved that there was some corrupt agreement or device, or shift, to cover usury,

.J:-

OJ&l, that it was in the full contemplation of the -( j/

Pj!:!tie.s.." (Italics supplied by the Utah Court.)
c.. \
The court in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, made it
clear in the following language that usury is not made
out even though it is apparent that more than the lawful
rate of interest upon the contract was asked or received,
and that such was in the full contemplation of the parties.

"The mere fact that one may pay to another
an excessive rate of interest pursuant to a con-'
tract is not always sufficient to authorize a find-\
ing of usury. If that were so, every contract upon ·
which more than the amount permitted by the
statute were paid would be usurious regardless
of the intention of either the borrower or the
lender. If that were the law the intention would
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cease to be an element in the law of usury. In
order to constitute usury, as Mr. Justiee .Storey
puts it, 'there must be a corrupt agreement',
.lin addition to the payment of an excessive rate
( of interest."

.

If, for the sake of illustration, we concede that there
was an excessive rate of interest in this case, where is
the evidence that the parties fully contemplated a corrupt agreement to violate the usury law, or a device
or ·shift, to cover usury~ No such evidence was presented
and there is no evidence from which it may be inferred.
An unlawful intent may be inferred if a usurious interest is apparent upon the face of the note or contract.
T.~e note in thjs case is bona fide upon its face. This

t:fe

b:1!::f t~:r::~e:n:=~tn~~:d~::~v:~r~:;:e~::.

~G

he judgment cannot stand since such intent, as we
ave seen, is an essential element of usury in this state.
POINT NO.2.

THE DECREE CANNOT STAND BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWS A SALE OF PLAINTIFF'S CREDIT
RATHER THAN A LOAN OF MONEY FROM PLAINTIFF,
THE LATTER BEING AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
USURY.

A careful examination of the facts reveals that the
substance of the transaction between plaintiffs and dP.fendants was a sale of credit rather than a loan of
money. In determining whether usury is present the
courts look to the substance of the transaction rather
than the form. See Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, Fisher
v. Adamson, supra, Mathis et al. v. Holland Furnace Co.:
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s·upra, Brown v. J'ohnson, 8Upra.
The defendants were unable to borrow money. (R.
39) There were apparent attempts to borrow, but for
some unnamed reason, presumably lack of security,
poor credit, or otherwise, defendants' were unable to
accomplish it. There was some discussion of defendants' inability in this respect. (R. 7, 8, 37) In these
discussions it was known that plaintiff had no money
to loan, that he would have to travel to Logan to contact third persons to attempt obtaining the money. (R.
8, 9, 54) This was agreeable to defendants. Plaintiff
testified and defendant stated he understood plaintiff
would use his credit to obtain the money. (R. 54)
Plaintiff obtained $1500.00 from a third person and
agreed to pay 6% interest. At the time the note was
signed· defendant understood it included a hundred dollar fee for obtaining the money. (R. 53) A man's
credit has monetary value. It is developed through
years of fair dealings and is a commodity that can be
rightfully sold. In this instance a reasonable fee was
agreed upon for the sale of plaintiff's credit.
The law is clear that a sale of credit is not within
the usury Statute. See Seeman, et al. v. Philadelphia
Warehouse Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 626; Oil City Motor Co. v.
C.I.T. Corp., 76 F (2) 589; Title Guaranty and Swrety
Co. v. Klein, 178 F. 689.
55 Am. J ur. 343 provides :
"It is well settled that the usury law is inapplicable to a transaction amounting merely to a
loan or sale of credit, and a loan of money, to
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facilitate which a loan of credit is made, is not
rendered usurious by the payment of, or agreement to pay, a sum exacted for the loan of the
credit. However, it is difficult to lay down any
general rule as to what amounts to a sale of
credit as distinguished from a loan. Although the
transaction must not be a mere cover for usury,
and in the decision of this question the intent of
the parties is important, generally speaking, consideration must be given to the particular facts
in order to determine whether one of the parties
to the transaction is to advance the money, or
whether the advance is to be made in the first
instance by a third party."
In this case it· is clear that the money in the first
instance was advanced by a third party upon the credit
of plaintiff. (R. 9, 10, 54.) A good discussion of this
point is found in 104 A.L.R. 245. The following cases
seem particularly applicable to this situation and support the general proposition: White v. Anderson, 164
Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122; Palmer v. Jones, 23
N.Y. S. 584.
rhe present tr.ansaction be,ing in fact and in substance, a sale of credit, and a sale of credit not comi~~
within the usury law, it follows that usury has not
been established.

POINT NO.3.
THE JUDGMENT IS FAULTY BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW AN EXACTION OF MORE INTEREST THAN IS ALLOWED BY LAW.

The fact that the amount of a note exceeds the sum
actually loaned by a sum greater than the interest
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charge sanctioned by the statute does not conclusively
establish an intent to transgress its terms. Atlas Realty
Corp. v. House, 132 Conn. 94, 192 A. 564.

In the case of Fisher v. Adamson, supra, the Utah
Court laid down the rule that :a charge for services
rendered, in connection with obtaining the loan, in addition to the highest rate of interest upon the money
loaned, does not render the transaction usurious. In
that case a note was given providing for payment of
$300.00 in 60 days without interest to maturity and the
maximum legal rate of interest ,after maturity. The
lender paid the borrower $290.00, he having deducted
$10.00 for services rendered in looking up the security.
The court adopted the following statement from 39
Cyc. 981:
"The circumstances attendant upon the making of a loan may require many kinds of services
to be rendered to the borrower by the lender or
his agent. For such services rendered in good
faith the lender may properly require of the
borrower a reasonable compensation in addition
to the highest legal rate of interest upon the
money loaned. Nor will an honest agreement
for such compensation render the loan illegal,
even though service rendered may be such as
the lender would ordinarily perform in his own
interest.''
The Restatement of Contracts, Section 533, and
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 6, Section 1694, Page 4792,
are to the same effect.
Conceding, for the sake of argument only, that a
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loan by plaintiff is involved, let us look to the substance
of this transaction to see what compensation might be
allowed for services rendered and other credits before
a computation of interest is made.
The testimony indicated that

pl~aintiff

made a trip

to Logan to obtain the money. The expense consisted
of gasoline and oil, wear and tear upon plaintiff's automobile, meals, plaintiff's time and services, and what
plaintiff termed his "reputation", obviously a reference to his credit. (R. 23, 24). No monetary amount
was placed upon these items, except gasoline, but for
the purpose of illustration to show the expenses were
not unreasonable we

m~ake

the following comments. The

distance from Salt Lake to Logan and return is 170
miles, and it is not unreasonable that plaintiff traveled
10 miles in addition. Eight cents per mile is a common
rate paid by several companies. Testimony indicated
the trip was made on a Sunday, considered the best day
of the week for real estate business. A charge of $45.00
for plaintiff's time and service would not be unreasonable. Plaintiff agreed to pay interest of 6% to the third
party from whom he obtained the money. To determine
usury then it is suggested a computation might be made
as follows:
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CASH AND SERVICES
Travel (Salt Lake, Logan, vicinity
and return) 180 mi. @ .08................ $ 14.40
Meals ........................................................
4.00
Plaintiff's time and services.................. 45.00
Interest to third party............................ 22.50
Cash paid for defendants' benefit........ 1500.00
ToTAL CAsH AND SERVICES.............................. 1585.90
Maximum allowable interest................ 39.75
TOTAL CHARGE PERMITTED UNDER LAW........ $1625.65
ToTAL AMouNT OF NoTE (including
interest for 3 mo.) --··················-····-·---$1624.00

j

Although the burden is upon defendants to show usury,
the presumption being there is no usury, it is obvious 1
from the above that the total charge of $100.00 was not1
unreasonable for plaintiff's expenses and services.
Uncontroverted evidence was presented that def~ndants were in default on the contract to purchase
the property, and thereafter that plaintiffs signed an
agreement with the seller of the property, and, in fact,
made payment of $1250.00 towards such purchase. Defendants understood that plaintiffs had acquired an
interest in the property and were giving it up. The
respective rights of plaintiffs and defendants in the
property when plaintiffs had signed the uniform real
estate contract, it is true, were not litigated. The saving
of a possible loss of defendants' earnest money is ,a

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

factor that should be considered not only in determin.
ing the advantage to the borrower but to show the good
intention of the plaintiffs. It is suggested that the
settlement of a claim which might be a cloud upon a
title (Plaintiff's rights in the property) is entirely
proper. Testimony was given that the property had a
market value of $1000.00 above the selling price (R. 49)
Since plaintiffs were going to have a one-half interest in
the property a credit of $500.00 might be given. If this
is added to the above figure of $1625.65 making a total
of $2125.65 it is difficult to see how an agreement to
pay $1624.00 would be usurious.
POINT NO.4.
THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD
NOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT DEFEATS THE AN·
NOUNCED PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE.

The purpose of usury statutes is set forth in

Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Company, 69 Utah 41,
252 P. 276:
"It is, however, ~argued by appellants that,
by reason of the language of our statute, the
r~egislature not only intended to protect the bor/ · rower, as do the statutes of many other states,
1
but that the legislative intent was also to penal\_ ize the lender by providing for the forfeiture of
not only the interest but of the debt itself, and
also by making the lender contracting for usurious
interest guilty of a misdemeanor. Granting that
the language of the statute is drastic, nevertheless
the primary purpose and object of the law re-
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mains. That object, as agreed by ~all the courts
under the statutes as comprehensive as ours, is
not the punish1nent of the lender but the protection of the borrower. That conceded purpose of
the Legislature, as stated by the Supreme Court
of "\Visconsin, enters into, and to a very large
extent controls, the interpretation of the statutes, and the courts have so been influenced in
tqe construction of these laws. It is true that it
is the duty of courts to enforce the plain intent
of the statute when the parties entitled to the
benefit of the statute ask for its protection. Courts
do not, however, and ought not, so interpret a
legislative act that the property of one citizen is
forfeited and lost to another, unless the plain
and unequivocal mandate of the Legislature
admits of no other rational construction.''
Defendant testified that he borrowed the money because they (Christensen Realty) had $500.00 of his
money. He admitted, however, that he was told the
money would be refunded to him without loss if he
wanted it. This was not a situation, therefore, in which
defendants were at the mercy of the plaintiffs.
If the lower court's decision is allowed to stand '
it will result in the taking of property from the plaintiffs
and awarding the same to the defendants. Such a result would exceed the announced purpose of the usury
law, that of protecting the borrower, by depriving plaintiffs of property and awarding it to defendants. Such
a policy we submit is not in the public interest. A borrower with the secret intention of enriching himself can
do so by negoti~ating a loan with interest in excess of
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that allowed by law. What was intended as a shield
becomes a sword under such doctrine.
In the words of Mr. Justice Frick, in Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra :
''To enforce a judgment under such circumstances would be to perpetvate a wrong, not to
vindicate one. ''
CONCLUSION
Appellants contend that usury was not proved in the
trial court. Three essential elements are lacking, namely:
1. A corrupt intent to violate the usury law;

2. A loan of money by plaintiffs to defendants; and
3. The exaction of more interest than is allowed by
law.

To sustain the lower court would be going against
the law as heretofore announced by the Supreme Court.
Appellants respectfully urge the Court to reverse
the judgment of the trial court and grant the relief
prayed for in their complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN F ARR LARSON,
.Attorney for Plaintiffs
and .Appellants.
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